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SOFTWOOD LUMBER – SOME LESSONS FROM 
THE LAST SOFTWOOD (LUMBER IV) DISPUTE
Elaine Feldman
SUMMARY 
The checkered history of softwood lumber disputes between Canada and its 
southern neighbour stretches back to the 1800s, with five of them occurring 
since 1982. Two years ago, the settlement obtained in 2006 expired and most 
Canadian softwood lumber exporters now face a combined countervailing 
and anti-dumping duty rate from the Americans of around 27 per cent.
On the surface, the last dispute, known as Lumber IV, appeared to be a 
squabble over subsidization and dumping of Canadian softwood lumber 
exports. However, closer scrutiny revealed that this dispute was really about 
commercial interests triumphing over policy – the U.S. lumber industry wanted 
to ensure it kept a certain share of the market at the highest price possible.
Complicating attempts to resolve any dispute is the fact that Canada is not a 
single entity in the lumber business; interest in quota or duties varies across 
regions as do the countervailing (CVD) and anti-dumping (AD) rates that the 
U.S. imposes on particular Canadian producers. These variations thus create 
almost a divide-and-conquer situation in which one group of producers feels 
others are getting an advantage. The Canadian industry instead should be 
standing together as much as possible, creating a united front in any dispute 
with the U.S.
Drafting new policy and resorting to litigation to settle Lumber IV failed 
because the potential settlement got bogged down by the drawbacks of 
both of those routes. Policy failed because it quickly became clear that 
the U.S. was going to act with impunity to determine whether there was a 
subsidy, regardless of what the trade rules permitted. And litigation created 
an endless loop in which contradictory rulings were handed back and forth 
between NAFTA panels and the U.S. International Trade Commission, 
stalling any resolution. Lumber IV also taught the Canadians that taking their 
complaints to both NAFTA and the World Trade Organization, which does 
not order a refunding of wrongly collected duties, only further muddied the 
hoped-for outcome. It took political will on the part of both the U.S. and 
Canada to finally reach a solution.
Nevertheless, Chapter 19 of NAFTA played a key role in establishing the 2006 
softwood lumber accord between the U.S. and Canada, and the return to Canada 
of approximately $4 billion of the $5 billion worth of duties deemed to have been 
wrongly collected by the Americans. A renegotiation of NAFTA that would see the 
elimination of Chapter 19, which the U.S. has called for, would make the settlement 
of Lumber V much more difficult, politicized and litigious. The absence of Chapter 
19 could also threaten other Canadian industries should the U.S. proceed with 
industry requests to impose CVD and/or AD duties (Boeing and its complaint against 
Bombardier being the most recent example).
1INTRODUCTION
Forest products have been a cause of trade friction between Canada and the United States for a 
very long time, with disputes going back to the early 1800s. However, the current era of softwood 
lumber disputes began with Lumber I in October 1982. The U.S. Coalition for Fair Canadian 
Lumber Imports alleged that certain Canadian softwood lumber products were subsidized and 
petitioned the U.S. Department of Commerce for the imposition of a countervailing duty against 
Canadian softwood lumber imports. Since that time, there have been periods of relative peace 
(usually as a result of a managed trade agreement between Canada and the United States), 
interspersed with disputes. Canada now finds itself enmeshed in the latest such dispute (Lumber 
V) which fits this pattern. After the expiry of the 2006 Canada- U.S. Softwood Lumber Agreement 
in 2015 and the one-year standstill agreement preventing U.S. industry from bringing any trade 
cases, most Canadian softwood lumber exporters now face a combined countervailing (CVD) and 
antidumping duty (AD) rate of approximately 27 per cent. Some Canadian companies have their 
own specific individual rates. For example, J.D. Irving has the lowest combined rate of 9.87 per 
cent, composed of an AD rate of 6.87 per cent and a CVD rate of 3.02 per cent. Canfor Corporation 
has the highest combined rate, composed of an AD rate of 7.72 per cent and a CVD rate of 20.26 
per cent.
At the time of writing, there is a “gap period” during which the CVD duties are not being collected. 
That is because the U.S. Tariff Act provides that preliminary CVD duties cannot be in place for 
more than 120 calendar days. As the duties began to be collected as of 12:00 am on April 28, 2017, 
the period during which they could be collected ended as of 11:59 pm on August 26, 2017. AD 
duties are still being collected as they began to be collected later (June 20, 2017) and a similar 120 
period is not yet up.The U.S. Department of Commerce has announced that it will postpone until no 
later than November 13, 2017 its final determinations in both the countervailing and anti-dumping 
duty investigations.
A Commerce final determination date of November 13, 2017 would be followed by a final injury 
determination by the U.S. International Trade Commission, no later than December 21, 2017. Final 
duties would then be imposed upon publication of the final duty order in the U.S. Federal Register. 
This is expected to occur in late 2017 or early 2018, although it is possible that these dates could be 
moved up.
Why do Canadian softwood lumber exports to the United States create such trade friction, which 
at times spills over and can have detrimental effects on broader issues between the two countries? 
How does NAFTA fit into it? As a member and then for a time head of the Canadian negotiating 
team for the last softwood lumber dispute, I believe that there are lessons that can be learned from 
Lumber IV which went on from 2001-2006. 
The United States softwood lumber industry, often with the support of their government, has been 
arguing since Lumber I in 1982 that Canadian softwood lumber is subsidized, mainly through 
provincial stumpage systems, and that this subsidy is injuring or threatening to injure the U.S. 
industry. Since Lumber IV they have also argued that Canadian softwood lumber is exported at 
dumped prices, i.e., that the product is being sold in the United States at a price lower than that at 
which it is sold on the Canadian domestic market. 
It might surprise many Canadians to know that softwood lumber, like almost every other good 
(dairy and poultry products are notable exceptions) is covered by NAFTA and subject to no tariffs 
on exports to the United States. Similarly, the United States could export its softwood lumber duty-
free to Canada. Both countries, however, retain their ability to apply their respective trade remedy 
laws against imports from the other country. Trade remedies are tools that allow governments 
to take action against imports which are causing or threatening to cause injury to a domestic 
industry. For the purposes of the softwood lumber dispute, the remedies are anti-dumping (AD) and 
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apply its antidumping law and countervailing duty law to goods imported from the territory of any 
other Party.” 
This means that a domestic industry which considers that it is injured or there is a threat of injury as a 
result of subsidized or dumped (or both) imports, can request that its government take actions against 
such imports. Should the government find that imports are subsidized or dumped (or both) and that 
such imports are causing or threatening to cause injury to the domestic industry, the government 
can impose AD or CVD, or as in Lumber IV and V, both AD and CVD duties. The findings, leading 
to the imposition of the duties, can be challenged in domestic courts, under NAFTA Chapter 19 
binational panels or in the dispute settlement proceedings of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
The foregoing fits neatly into the realm of trade policy and dispute settlement: the U.S. industry 
alleges subsidy and dumping of Canadian softwood lumber; the Department of Commerce finds that 
to be the case and determines the amount of the subsidy and the dumping; the U.S. International 
Trade Commission determines whether there is injury or threat of injury to U.S. softwood lumber 
producers. But a close examination of Lumber IV shows that the U.S. industry is not really 
interested in whether Canadian softwood lumber exports are subsidized or dumped, but rather 
in ensuring that the U.S. industry maintains a certain share of the market, at the highest possible 
price. And the U.S. government is largely captive to industry perceptions. Commercial interests, not 
policy, prevail.
What does this mean for Canadian interests? It is important to recognize that there is no one 
Canadian interest, but rather regional interests. At one end is British Columbia, generally supported 
by Alberta. B.C., which has traditionally accounted for about half of Canada’s softwood lumber 
exports to the United States, has large trees and large, efficient producers. Quebec and Ontario have 
small trees and smaller producers. The Atlantic provinces have traditionally been exempt from any 
CVD actions and have worked strenuously to remain exempt from any managed trade agreement. 
(While Lumber IV included Atlantic producers in the U.S. AD determination, they were not 
included in the 2006 Softwood Lumber Agreement). 
As a result, one of the main issues for the Canadian federal negotiators in their attempt to resolve 
the dispute with the United States has been keeping “Team Canada” together. Producers across the 
country are suspicious that others may have an advantage. The fact that the U.S. sets specific CVD 
and AD rates, which vary, for some of the large companies and then applies an “all others” rate to 
every other producer reinforces those concerns. At one point during the Lumber IV dispute there 
was an attempt to reach a settlement which was brokered by some of the large B.C. companies. 
This attempt foundered because it did not take sufficient account of the concerns of companies 
across the country. One-size solutions don’t work, and the 2006 agreement reflected this. 
POLICY-BASED SOLUTION
Much of the early negotiations to resolve Lumber IV centered on provincial stumpage systems, 
which differ from province to province. In 2002-2003, while vigorously contesting the U.S. finding 
that provincial stumpage systems constituted a countervailable subsidy under both the NAFTA 
and the WTO dispute settlement systems, the federal and provincial negotiators were willing 
to explore whether there was a potential policy-based resolution to the dispute. As a result, the 
U.S. Department of Commerce led a process to develop a policy bulletin which would set out the 
changes that individual provinces would make to their stumpage systems, thereby reducing or 
eliminating the alleged provincial subsidies. Once those measures were in place, Commerce would 
carry out a changed-circumstance review with the implicit understanding that it would find that the 
subsidies no longer existed and the CVD rate would be zero. (The policy bulletin process did not 
address the AD issues). 
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exporting provinces (B.C., Quebec, Ontario and Alberta) entered into discussions on the policy 
bulletin approach with Commerce. However, it became clear that reforms to stumpage were not 
sufficient – the U.S. industry insisted on an effects test, i.e., they wanted a determination by 
Commerce that the reforms had actually had the effects that the U.S. industry was seeking. That 
was effectively the end of the policy-based approach to resolving Lumber IV. It was clear that the 
U.S. industry and the Department of Commerce would use whatever methodologies they found 
convenient, whether or not permitted by trade rules, to determine what was or was not a subsidy. 
It can be argued that the latest U.S. CVD finding reinforces this point. The U.S. has now subjected 
New Brunswick producers to the CVD duty, despite historically exempting them because of their 
system of largely privately owned forest lands. 
It was also clear during Lumber IV that the producer lobby in the U.S. has much more influence 
than the consumer lobby. The U.S. National Association of Home Builders was firmly opposed to 
the U.S. imposition of CVD and AD duties, arguing that the duties would raise the cost of housing, 
but their position had no influence on U.S. government actions then, and is unlikely to have any 
influence now. It is possible that the rebuilding that will be necessary in Texas and Florida as a 
result of Hurricanes Harvey and Irma may give some additional economic and political clout to 
those, such as the Home Builders, who oppose duties that raise the cost of lumber. But this remains 
to be seen and the producer lobby continues to carry the heavy hand.
LITIGATION
At the same time as the policy bulletin was under development, Canada had challenged U.S. 
findings of subsidy, dumping and threat of injury under both the NAFTA and the WTO. The U.S. 
International Trade Commission had not found that the U.S. industry was injured by the allegedly 
subsidized and dumped imports of Canadian softwood lumber, but only that there was a threat of 
injury to U.S. producers. Threat of injury is sufficient to allow for the imposition of CVD and AD 
duties. Conversely, without injury or threat of injury, no CVD or AD duties can be imposed. 
The WTO and NAFTA dispute settlement systems look at different issues and have different 
remedies. A WTO case looks at whether the international rules governing trade remedies which 
both Canada and the U.S. have signed onto have been followed. If they have not, the WTO calls 
on the party that violated the rules to remove its inconsistent measures and to bring itself into 
conformity with the rules. If it fails to do so, the winning party can then retaliate. This is not 
always easy, particularly if the winning party is small and the loser large.
Panels established under Chapter 19 of the NAFTA examine whether the country that has found 
subsidy, dumping, injury or the threat of injury has followed its own laws. If the NAFTA panel 
finds that the country has not acted according to its own laws, then the CVD or AD or injury or 
threat of injury finding is set aside and the duties that have been collected until then are refunded 
to the companies that paid them. This is a key difference between the WTO and NAFTA dispute 
settlement systems – there is no refund of duties improperly collected under the WTO. 
The legal cases against the U.S. CVD, AD and threat of injury findings were made more 
complicated by the fact that the U.S. applies a system of retrospective application of duties. It sets 
a preliminary rate and then subsequently revisits the issues to determine the final rate. The result 
is that litigation is always playing catch-up. This, along with the interplay of the two different 
dispute settlement systems, the NAFTA and the WTO, did not always lead to the results that 
Canada had anticipated.
The most telling example of the complexities around the approach to bringing all disputes to both 
the NAFTA and the WTO arose in the summer of 2005 with the interplay between the findings 
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panel established to examine the U.S. finding of threat of injury found that the U.S. International 
Trade Commission (ITC) had not acted in accordance with U.S. law when it made its finding. 
It sent the issue back to the ITC to reconsider. The ITC, on remand, continued to find threat of 
injury. Each time, the ITC finding went back to the NAFTA panel, which found there was no 
proper evidentiary basis for the ITC’s finding. In its third ruling, the NAFTA panel concluded 
that the ITC had refused to follow the panel’s instructions and directed it to find no threat of 
injury: “The Commission has made it abundantly clear to this Panel that it is simply unwilling to 
accept this Panel’s review authority under Chapter 19 of the NAFTA and has consistently ignored 
the authority of this Panel in an effort to preserve its finding of threat of material injury.” In 
September 2004 the ITC, while disagreeing with the panel, issued a determination that the U.S. 
softwood lumber industry was not threatened with material injury. 
At the same time as the NAFTA panel was proceeding, Canada had challenged the ITC finding of 
threat of injury before the WTO and had also been successful in that forum. However, given that 
the WTO remedy is for the losing Party to bring its measure into conformity with the international 
trade rules, the U.S. asked the ITC to make a new determination consistent with the WTO 
ruling. This allowed the ITC to make yet another finding of threat of injury (called a Section 129 
determination) in November 2004, subsequent to its September finding of no threat of injury.
Complicated. But it gets worse! The U.S. challenged the NAFTA panel’s direction to the ITC to 
an Extraordinary Challenge Committee (ECC). On August 10, 2005 the ECC upheld the NAFTA 
panel’s ruling. That should have been sufficient to overturn the CVD and AD duties and enable the 
return of the monies (approximately $3 billion at that point) to the Canadian producers. 
Canada had in the meantime challenged the Section 129 determination as not being in compliance 
with WTO rules and had asked the WTO for authority to retaliate. A WTO Injury Compliance Panel 
had been set up to look at those issues and it upheld, in an interim decision on August 29, 2005 and 
in its final decision in November 2005, the ITC Section 129 determination. 
So where did that leave Canada and the U.S. and what lessons can be drawn? The U.S. refused to 
refund the duties, arguing that the ITC’s November 2004 Section 129 determination was valid and so, 
therefore, was its continued collection of CVD and AD duties despite the NAFTA panel’s and ECC 
findings. In the latest lumber dispute Canada will need to assess the strategy of bringing effectively 
the same issue to both the NAFTA and the WTO in order to avoid the threat of injury result. 
Litigation continued under both the NAFTA and the WTO until an agreement was finally 
reached outside of these fora in 2006. That agreement ended the outstanding litigation. Without 
an agreement, would Canada finally have prevailed and would the U.S. have returned the duties 
collected, approximately $5 billion by 2006, as they eventually did? There were some in the U.S. 
who attempted to argue that the NAFTA did not actually require the refund of the wrongly-imposed 
duties to those who paid them.
There are some in Canada who argue that litigation is the only route to follow, that it is the only 
way to ensure that the U.S. cannot at will impose CVD and AD duties on Canadian softwood 
lumber. Others believe that given the ingenuity of legal arguments that can be devised, there 
will be an endless loop of litigation and that winning is not sufficient. Not to be forgotten is that 
litigation is expensive. It is estimated that Lumber IV cost the Canadian federal and provincial 
governments, industry associations and individual companies over $500 million by the time the 
agreement was finalized. 
Moreover, the amount of duties that the U.S. collected in Lumber IV was an issue in itself. At 
various points in the negotiations that were underway at the same time as the litigation, the ever-
increasing amount of duties collected became a stumbling block to resolution. Canadians believed 
firmly that the duties, having been wrongly collected, were to be returned pursuant to the NAFTA 
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would enable the Canadians to ride out market downturns. The agreement that was finally struck in 
2006 left $1 billion of the $5 billion that had been collected to fund a binational group designed to 
look to future Canada-U.S. cooperation on growing the market for softwood lumber.
There were added complications in Lumber IV relating to the refund of the duties, namely the so-
called Byrd Amendment legislation. This U.S. legislation would have allowed the duties collected 
to be distributed to the U.S. producers rather than remain with the Treasury. This law was found 
by the WTO to be contrary to international trade rules. While the Byrd Amendment legislation has 
been repealed, the arguments against the refund of duties under the NAFTA may well reappear as 
Lumber V drags on.
REACHING AN AGREEMENT - POLITICAL WILL
By the summer/fall of 2005 it became apparent to Canadian negotiators that a solution to Lumber 
IV that was either a quota deal or an export tax deal and that did not exempt the Atlantic provinces 
and the Quebec border mills would not succeed in achieving consensus within the Canadian 
industry and provinces. While the exemption for the Atlantic provinces did not sit especially well 
with the rest of the country, their relatively small share of the U.S. market and their demonstrated 
political capacity to scuttle a deal that included them, eventually overcame objections within 
Canada to their exemption. At the same time, the concept of an asymmetrical solution that broadly 
aligned with regional interests – an export tax for British Columbia and Alberta and quotas coupled 
with lower rates of export tax for Quebec and Ontario – gained currency.
On the political stage, the 2006 federal election led to a minority Conservative government under 
Prime Minister Stephen Harper, who was eager to resolve the lumber dispute and put relations 
with the United States on a more even keel. However, while softwood lumber was a key irritant 
for Canada in its relationship with the United States, it was not viewed the same way in the U.S. 
Political will at the highest level in the U.S. was a prerequisite to reaching a negotiated solution. 
Without that, the interests of the lumber producers who call the shots by bringing subsidy and 
dumping cases forward to the government would continue to prevail. This required a willingness 
on the part of the President to use some political capital to bring U.S. industry on board for a 
negotiated solution that was also acceptable to Canada.
Companies have such clout because they bring forward the initial CVD and AD cases. Chapter 19 
only comes into play after the government has imposed the AD and CVD duties, which are then 
subject to challenge. A key piece of any lumber agreement is getting the U.S. producers to agree 
to not bring forward any cases during the term of the agreement. This was done in 2006 by U.S. 
producers agreeing to submit and be bound by "no injury" letters. Without injury or the threat of 
injury, no CVD or AD duties can be imposed by the government.
That political will became apparent following the election of Prime Minister Harper and his 
meeting with then-president George W. Bush at the “Three Amigos Summit” in Mexico in March 
of 2006. Responsibility for the conduct of the bilateral negotiations shifted from the Department of 
Commerce (the senior U.S. official at DOC responsible for lumber had left his position) to the Office 
of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). Negotiations on the Canadian side were led by Canada’s 
recently appointed Ambassador to the United States - Michael Wilson. These efforts eventually led 
to the 2006 Softwood Lumber Agreement which resolved the Lumber IV trade dispuite.
What does this tell us about where we are today? The United States under President Trump has 
begun the process of renegotiating NAFTA, in which one of their demands is the abolition of the 
Chapter 19 dispute settlement system. Chapter 19 was key to the eventual resolution of Lumber IV 
and the return of 80 per cent of the duties collected to Canadian producers. (As an aside, Chapter 19 
may well be key to other current disputes between Canada and the U.S., eg., in aerospace and steel). 
6It is still unclear as to what the mindset of U.S. trade negotiators and indeed the President himself 
will be in trade negotiations, whether relating to the NAFTA or specific disputes such as softwood 
lumber. Will it be a “one side wins, one side loses,” as some of the President’s rhetoric would lead 
one to believe? Or will it be more along the lines of what President Obama suggested, but was 
unable to deliver - “each side will want 100 per cent, and we’ll find a way for each side to get 60 per 
cent or so of what they need, and people will complain and grumble but it will be fine”? 
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